Spontaneous freedom - Ethics volume 135, number 4, July 2025

Jonathan Gingerich's article "Spontaneous Freedom," published in Ethics volume 135, number 4, July 2025, challenges the conventional focus of contemporary moral philosophy on forms of freedom tied to moral responsibility, autonomy, and rational choice. Gingerich argues that this philosophical tradition overlooks a crucial aspect of our everyday experience of freedom—the "spontaneous freedom" of unplanned, unscripted, and unalienated activity. In the process of introducing the idea as a neglected concept, Gingerich posits that a kind of freedom, which he terms "spontaneous freedom," is central to how we talk about and experience freedom in our daily lives. This is the freedom enjoyed by "free spirits" and is captured by phrases like "free as a bird" or "the freedom of the open road."

 As for the nature of the nature of spontaneous freedom he characterizes spontaneous freedom as the experience of our actions arising from within ourselves, but not as the result of a pre-determined plan, script, or deliberative choice. This freedom is often associated with activities like creative expression, play, and resistance to authority.

 

Acrylic on canvas - untitled by Bargode displayed at the PRADYOT ART GALLERY 

Gingerich makes a strong case for the value of spontaneous freedom. He argues that it is a necessary condition for a certain kind of genuine creativity and that it helps us confront existential anxieties by showing us that we are more than just our rational, deliberative selves. In the process, the article critiques existing philosophical theories of freedom, particularly those that prioritize rational deliberation and planning. Gingerich suggests that these theories, such as Christine Korsgaard's theory of self-constitution, often rule out the possibility of spontaneous freedom for "well-constituted agents" because they require actions to be antecedently fixed by one's plans.

 Possible implications for philosophy and politics. 

Gingerich argues that recognizing the value of spontaneous freedom has significant implications for both philosophy and politics. It offers new insights into the free will debate, particularly by making sense of the libertarian claim that compatibilist theories of freedom do not allow for true novelty. Politically, he suggests that respecting the value of spontaneity requires that social institutions and governments avoid trying to control or manage behavior in certain domains, such as artistic creativity. The article also raises questions about how best to regulate emerging digital technologies and artificial intelligence that rely on data to predict and shape our choices.

My perception 

What is freedom if not spontaneous. I wonder if an adjective does change the nature of freedom. Let me restrict the discussion to the freedom of thoughts. Let me assume the nature of agency to be deliberate. Then one would say ' now is shall think with our plans in my mind' and yet plan to think in a way. Arguing the other way ' now I shall only think spontaneously without plans in mind ' and yet that is a planned thought. To me freedom by its nature as i understand is inherently spontaneous, allowing an open landscape to choose from and yet decisions are motivated and restricted by our recent and past experience. Yes we do see a form of spontaneous freedom, if at all it may qualify for the ignorance of childhood and the deceptions of senility. But then it did not appear to be the area of discussion in this article.

Pratyush Chaudhuri